Understanding What Other Animals Think
Marc Bekoff, Ph.D.
Why do researchers study the behavior of nonhuman animals? Is it mere curiosity, or does an understanding of other animals' thought processes assist humans and nonhumans? Is such an understanding even possible?
One supposed rationale for studying nonhuman cognition is to better understand human behavior. Recognizing the evolutionary continuity between humans and other animals,(1) many researchers reasonably conclude that humans and other animals (certainly, those with complex nervous systems) share certain basic emotions and thought processes, as well as psychopathologies.(2) Interpreting such processes, however, is fraught with difficulty. To what extent are particular behaviors inextricably linked to particular cognitive processes? To what extent are these behaviors and processes analogous to those in humans? Surely, human psychology is best understood by studying humans.
For those fascinated by nonhuman cognition itself, observing other animals is both logical and intellectually rewarding. However, anyone who has ever cared for an animal of another species knows that observation of other animals continually offers new information and insights. It is not necessary to harm other animals in order to learn about them. If anything, a willingness to harm other animals might indicate an insensitivity that precludes genuine empathy and understanding.(3)
Industries that exploit nonhuman animals support the study of nonhuman cognition for pragmatic reasons. Stress can damage the flesh quality of animals raised for food;(4,5) it can keep zoo animals from reproducing;(6) it invalidates experimental data.(7) Meat producers, zoo managers, animal experimenters and others, therefore, have an interest in learning about nonhuman stress.
Increased knowledge of nonhuman cognition can, however, also assist those who truly wish to help other animals.(8) Certainly, an understanding of what causes an animal pain is an important aspect of humane veterinary treatment. While animals remain in captivity, an understanding of their needs can also move people to improve the animals' conditions, thereby alleviating some of their frustration and discomfort. In a 1990 essay, Dawkins urges that knowledge of animals' behavior inform discussions of animal welfare and suffering.(9,10) Once again, however, it is not necessary to harm some animals in experimental studies. As with human medicine, clinical research can benefit both the present "subjects" and future patients.
What can we know of other minds?
Because other animals do not communicate verbally, researchers have tended to focus on their observable behavior. This behavior, however, is often uninterpretable. When an unfamiliar rat is introduced into another rat's cage, the resident rat may stand upright on his/her hind legs. Does the action indicate fear? aggression? curiosity? It's hard to know. Also, the generalization that the minds of other animals are in every way simpler than ours and, therefore, ideal for studies of "basic" mental processes is false. The spatial processing of many animals, for example, appears to surpass ours in power and sensitivity.(11-13)
The laboratory cannot reveal the complexity of nonhuman cognition. Laboratory studies deny animals their natural diet, habitat, and society. Placing an animal in an impoverished environment automatically reduces the range of behavior available to that animal.
The recognition of complex nonhuman behavior has derived primarily from non-laboratory observation. We now know that such animals as wolves, cetaceans, and nonhuman primates live in highly complex societies.(8,14-17) In addition to engaging in cooperative behavior, many vertebrates appear to use deception and evasion in manipulating peers.(16-18)
But field observation, too, can be interventive (19-21) and can create artifact. When ethologists observe wild coyotes, they can undoubtedly effect the coyotes' behavior by influencing the animals' movement or by forcing potential prey to scatter. When researchers count nest eggs in studies of bird nest defense behavior, the parent birds' defend their nest less vigilantly, apparently because they perceive strangers as non-threatening.(22) Trapping and marking individuals of many species influences their behavior (19,23-25) and that of their peers. For example, mate choice in zebra finches can be influenced by the colored leg bands used to mark individuals. Females with black bands and males with red bands had higher reproductive success than birds with other colors. Blue and green were especially unattractive on females and males, respectively.(26) It is difficult, if not impossible, to know in what ways and to what extent a human presence influences another animals' behavior.
In the end, understanding nonhuman cognition probably depends more on empathy that on knowledge derived from formal data.(27) Although we cannot quantify our empathy for other humans, or prove it factually correct, we do not feel required to justify it. The same sensibility that enables genuine understanding between humans must provide the basis for our understanding of other animals. Perhaps the best way to understand nonhuman animals is to allow them as much freedom as possible. That way, they can choose what to seek and what to avoid. By taking heed of their choices, we can go some distance in understanding who they really are.
Acknowledgement
I thank Stephen R. Kaufman, Joan Dunayer, Susan E. Townsend, Lori Gruen, Dale Jamieson, and Bernard E. Rollin for comments. They do not necessarily agree with all of my ideas.
References
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