Perspectives On Medical Research
Volume 5, 1995
Aping Science
A Critical Analysis of Research at the Yerkes
Regional Primate Research Center
Afterword
Daniel N. Robinson
Biological ideas about "kinship" affect our perceptions of other
humans and other species. And these notions, as this monograph documents, powerfully
influence the way we perceive ourselves. That we human beings are in some sense
like other animals is of course an ancient notion and one that led naturally
to the question of which species is most "human." In the pre-Darwinian
era, many naturalists were persuaded that the best measure of kinship is the
instinct for social affiliation and, on that basis, they reasoned that man
and dog are closest kin.
But, the Darwinian theory of evolution replaced all such notions. Kinship was then established by paths of descent, with lineal descendants enjoying the greatest degree of similarity in all respects. Darwin conceived of species existing as a continuum, and consequently species differ only in degree and not in kind. This reflects the facts that species arise from common ancestors and that all species confront similar challenges to survival that result in similar strategies to serve basic needs, including food-gathering, defense, procreation, and provisions for the young. Similarities in social structures are everywhere in nature, and Darwin recognized that he could not dismiss these as coincidental. Adaptation at the social level more or less mirrored the adaptive functions served by anatomy and physiology.
Such apparently multi-leveled similarity between human beings and other animals seemed to imply that no legitimate ontological boundaries between us and them exist. The question raised by Darwinism was: Why draw a line at intelligence or language or consciousness or, for that matter, even forms of altruism, affection, loyalty, or culture itself? In particular, viewed through the lens of early evolutionary theory, the very existence of monkeys and apes seemed to challenge the uniqueness of the human species. At the same time, fortunately for Darwin and the success of his theory, his continuum implies something of a terminus ad quem. If he failed to please the faithful of his time with what one critic called his "horrid genealogy," he at least offered a theory whose dynamic operations culminated in Homo sapiens, or as we have rather smugly come to call ourselves, Homo sapiens sapiens. What Scripture had God accomplishing in a matter of days now was seen as requiring millions of years and only then producing this one-of-a-kind entity, Homo sapiens--an entity with nearly perfected intellectual and moral capacities only deficiently prefigured in our non-human relatives. It could not be long before both the holy and scientific scriptures generated the apparently happy conclusion that we have both the right and need to exploit whatever species is within reach to further our understanding of ourselves.
Aping Science addresses a paradox: A half-century of expensive primate research has not only failed to deliver the benefits to human welfare promised by its early proponents, but the results have misled biomedical thinkers time and time again.
This situation calls for the attention and corrective energies of those entrusted with the public's limited wealth and limitless frailties. But there are other implications from this report. Darwin's legacy is at stake here. Charles Darwin was ardent in his concern for animals' and, had it not been for Thomas Huxley's importunate heeding, would have put his illustrious name to the antivivisection petitions of his day. We see, then, that a deep and principled concern for nonhuman life need not arise either from hostility toward science or ignorance of its aims and methods. Regarding vivisection as being impelled by little more than what he called "damnable curiosity," Darwin was concerned that the scientific community would oppose itself to the moral framework from which it derived its own existence. It is, ironically, the same Charles Darwin whose authority is routinely appropriated by those who undertake studies of nonhuman animals and who justify the use of primates on grounds of kinship! What of this matter of kinship? As Professor Lewontin makes clear,2 the genetic argument for kinship must fail when applied to species whose respective evolutionary histories diverged millions of years ago. The Darwinian conception of an evolutionary process that would assign all functional differences to places along a continuum has been superseded by modern genetics. There are indeed conspicuous qualitative differences not only between species but, via genetic diversity and relevantly dissimilar environments, within species as well. In his informing critique of defective notions of "models," Professor Lewontin recalls Norbert Wiener's remark that the best model of a cat is not only a cat but, "preferably the same cat"!
On the matter of kinship, one’s position cannot be stationary or simply located. The very concept of a species is predicated on resemblances shared by members of a common breeding pooi. In this admittedly narrow sense, "kinship" is greater among members of the same species than between members of two different species. The sense is narrow because it will apply more or less unerringly only to the most basic biochemical and physiological processes. As the actual details of the lives of the observed animals become more broadly studied, over longer durations and under varied conditions, theoretical predictions tend to be summarily vanquished by reality. One way to avert defeat of this kind is to restrict observations to relatively brief durations under specified conditions and with animals whose genetic background is rigorously controlled and invariant. Only in this way does the laboratory realize the full implications of biogenetic kinship, but now at the cost of reality itself. Alas, another paradox.
In his recent work Animal Minds and Human Reason,3 philosopher and classics scholar Richard Sorabji traces the evolution of ancient thought that culminated in the Stoic conviction that only humans have rights; rights available to those who occupy a common house and comprise a common family. Ethical obligations are determined by kinship, which is grounded in rationality and language. But it should be clearly obvious that "rights," whatever their ontology and source, are not synonymous with linguistic or rational competence. We do not confer rights in proportion to I.Q. scores or years of education or grammatical proficiency. They are instead essentially political creations allotted on grounds of kinship. So, it is to kinship that we again return.
The extraordinary genetic diversity within the human community revealed by Lewontin and others poses challenges both to biomedical researchers and to ethicists. It questions all research findings not based on studies of whole human populations. At the same time, it casts doubt on the concept of a human "family," except in the metaphorical sense. More than that, the great and growing disparities at the level of culture, moral values, social behavior, and basic approaches to life render the notion of family between members of different communities even more strained. Nonetheless, the defense of rights is not necessarily weakened. If the extension of basic rights is not predicated on biogenetic grounds or even on the basis of skills and intellectual or moral powers, just what is the basis? To a first approximation, I would argue that the basis is kindred vulnerabilities. To the extent that it is plausible to regard others as sharing our own capacities for pain or distress, we are inclined to overlook our differences and to proceed to extend relevant protections. At the most basic ethical level, it is not the religion or nationality or genotype or I.Q. of another that enlists our solicitude, but palpable evidence of actual or potential suffering.
Yes, we and the other apes parted filial company millions of years ago and are now probably incapable of entering into each other's life in any meaningful way. But, as Aping Science illustrates, we retain what is perhaps the most elemental grounds of kinship: A closely shared vulnerability to things destructive of our respective forms of life. Of course, human beings have defensive resources without parallel elsewhere in the animal world, including the ability to exploit resources effectively. If might does not make right, then an essentially moral justification is needed to defend harming others unnecessarily. Evolutionary theory is regarded by some as favoring us in this matter. Thus, human beings are, as the expression goes, "highest up on the food chain," in possessing the most developed intellectual faculties, and in being able to suffer more deeply owing to considerable cognitive powers. Accordingly, if any form of life must be sacrificed for any other, the nod goes to the more "advanced." However, such an ethic leaves physically and/or mentally infirm humans vulnerable to the same exploitation usually reserved for "lower" animals. This dilemma is partly resolved by this report's findings. Even if one were to accept the self-serving and problematic ethic that entitles humans to harm other animals, this report still indicts primate research on the grounds that it has not significantly helped humans.
It would be naive to finish this "Afterword" without noting that, despite the often sentimental humanitarianism of the scientific community, the basis upon which research programs are actually defended are often financial and careerist. For many years scientists engaged in what is called “pure” research regarded it as an impertinence to be asked if any actual benefit to mankind or daily life might be forthcoming. As the general population has become more educated and impatient, and as the national deficit has taken on galactic proportions, the scientists and their university agents have begun to issue promissory notes in return for their massive subsidies. Meanwhile, as financially strapped universities look to their science (and athletic) departments to underwrite major portions of university expenses, administrators are pushed by their Boards of Directors to secure grants, and individual scientists are spurred by administrators by having their professional status and even income is tied to grant application success. George Roche's recent The Fall of the Ivory Tower4 documents the effect of these grants upon the integrity and independence of the academic world. Thus, beyond the range of problems so precisely addressed in Aping Science, the Big Science movement in America has left a trail of broken promises and disasters large and small in its wake.
It is not fated that, alone among the residents of the biosphere, Americans
will come to be immortal. The noble goal of relieving suffering and prolonging
life must be prosecuted in a manner that does not strip life of a meaning
richer than mere biological survival. It cannot be in the public's interest
for its assets to be squandered in support of Big Science peddlers who
promise short-cut solutions to societal problems that are at once medical,
sociological, political, and in a larger sense moral. It cannot be in
the public's interest to expend fortunes on oversold "biomedical
research" undertakings marred by confusion and occasional fraud.
1. Rachels J. Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism.
New York, Oxford Univ Pr, 1991.
2. Lewontin RC. Primate models of human traits.
3. Sorabji R. Animal Minds and Human Morals. The Origins of the Western Debate. Ithica, Cornell University Press, 1993.
4. Roche G. The Fall of the Ivory Tower: Government Funding, Corruption, and the Bankrupting of Higher Education. Washington DC, Regnery Pub, 1994.