A Critique of Animal Psychology Research at the University
of California at Berkeley
Brandon P. Reines, D.V.M.
Discussion and Conclusion
The best-known pioneer of American physiological psychology was Dr. Karl Lashley (Thompson and Robinson, 1979, p. 426). Trained in bacteriology, Lashley was accustomed to the method of animal experimentation, and he had hoped such research would shed light on human psychology. In fact, Lashley spent his entire life searching for the physiological basis of "human memory" through animal experiments. In particular, he hoped to find a biochemical template of a specific memory, which he called 'The Engram." Following 30 years of research, Lashley wrote a scathing critique of his area of psychological inquiry. Lashley maintained in his 1950 paper, "In Search of the Engram," (1950) that none of the physiological theories of memory, including his own, had any basis whatever. He questioned whether it would ever be possible to elucidate a physiological basis for human psychology. Nonetheless, Lashley's research strategy continues to this day in the hands of his students, including Dr. Frank A. Beach of UC Berkeley. Even the quest for the elusive "Engram" is being carried on by a UC Berkeley researcher, Dr. Mark Rosenzweig.
The researchers at the University of California at Davis represent some of the leading physiological psychologists in the country. While they have received considerable attention in the popular press and they are esteemed by their fellow physiological psychologists, they do not appear to have made any contributions to our understanding of the human psyche. Critics of physiological psychology have suggested that it is impossible to translate information about animal physiology to human psychology. Bannister (1968) maintained that physiological psychology is based on linguistic distortions. In his critique, "The myth of physiological psychology," he proposed that it is impossible to "translate" the language of the physiologist into the language of the psychologist, and vice-versa. It is a simple matter of common sense that human mental experience and brain biochemistry are qualitatively distinct. Bannister wrote:
Essentially what is being argued is that psychological and physiological concepts stem from such different semantic networks that they cannot be meaningfully related into a subsystem. Ryles' ... influential criticism of the 'ghost in the machine' concept of mind did not sufficiently recognize the usefulness of this concept in drawing attention to the differences between the language in which we discuss 'the ghost' and the unrelated language in which we talk about 'the machine.' In brief, the chances of developing a science of physiological psychology are about as good (or as bad) as the chances of developing a 'chemical sociology' or a 'biological astronomy'...
A cursory examination of the language systems of physiology and psychology reveals four differences which together suggest that the languages are unlikely to be profitably related.
Firstly, the constructs of physiology and psychology have partially non-overlapping ranges of convenience: they deal with different phenomena... Thus physiology trafficks mainly in sub-skin phenomena while psychology trafficks mainly in molar movement phenomena.
Secondly, physiology need not be reflexive, but there are grounds for believing that psychology needs to be reflexive ... psychology needs to be self-referring because the concept of 'self' is essentially a psychological concept. Physiology does not need to be self-referring because 'self' is not a physiological concept.
Thirdly, physiology appears to have elaborated relatively successfully utilizing a mechanistic and deterministic model and by assuming the theoretical, if not the empirical, predictability of all its target phenomena. It is no accident that concepts such as consciousness, choice and teleological models are reiterative in psychology, since, in spite of the most gallant attempts, we have failed to get far by adhering to a purely mechanistic model...
Fourthly, though physiologists can generalize across the physiological systems of particular individuals, their language implies that the physiological processes of individuals are largely independent of and unrelated to each other. In contradistinction to this the language network of psychology repeatedly implies that psychological processes are interactive between individuals and even the most hard-shelled behaviourist tends to talk of a 'reinforcing community'.
If we assume, for a moment, that the arguments put forward for the unrelatability of physiology and psychology are valid, then there arises the problem of accounting for the continued persistence of physiological psychology as a popular area for research
Psychologists tend persistently to confuse technology with science. Technologies are practical in purpose rather than explanatory, in that the investigation of effects is secondary to the need to minimize or maximize them for other than scientific reasons. Additionally, technologies exist within a defined context which they are not committed to expanding. Many psychologists behave as if experiments in themselves constitute a science, as opposed to the viewpoint put forward by, say, Popper (1959) that the purpose of an experiment, for a scientist, is to demonstrate a point in an integrated argument. It is in the extension of the ongoing argument that the 'science' ultimately resides. Psychologists often tend to assume that the finding of significant relations is in itself a good thing, regardless of whether or not these contribute meaningfully towards any ongoing theoretical argument. In a technology a finding of significant relations is an end in itself in that they may be immediately made the basis for practical manipulations. The findings of physiological psychology are technological in this sense and are misrepresented in that they are put forward as 'science'. (Bannister, 1968, p.229)
Can mental experiences be described in physiological terms? Quantified physiological variables, such as hormone or neurotransmitter levels, are much easier to define and describe than psychological events, such as a visual image or a sense of love for a person. Given that physiology may appear more "scientific" that psychology, it is understandable that some psychologists would attempt to define mental experiences in physiological terms. Dr. Howard Alexander Bursen's critique of the idea that memories exist as discrete biochemical entities "floating" in the brain (i.e. "traces" or "engrams") showed the fallacy of this reasoning. He noted:
Briefly, my claim is this: While trace theory certainly seems to be scientific, it is not. Indeed, trace theory is nothing but a disguised philosophical theory. There are three considerations which support the claim that trace theory is philosophy, not science. First, it is historically an ancient theory put forward by philosophers. And the latest versions put forth by scientists are, underneath their technical jargon, the same old theory in new dress. Second, the criticisms here levelled against the theory are philosophical criticisms (and not, for example, scientific ones). And finally, the core of the theory itself - I mean the very notion of the memory trace - is a philosophical notion (1980, p.vii)
In fact, Bursen's rigorous argument shows that all physiological psychology
research is in fact a veiled form of philosophical investigation that
grapples with the age-old "mind-body problem." While there
is little historical evidence that physiological psychology evolved to
improve public health, it is fairly well known that the discipline was
created by philosophers and psychologists who were fascinated by the
mind-body enigma (Thompson and Robinson, 1979, p. 408). In addition,
there is abundant historical evidence that many leaders in physiological
psychology, including Beach, were originally motivated by a mystical
interest in solving the mind-body dichotomy (see, for example, Beach,
1985, p. 6). However, in order to receive financial support for their
academic interests, many such researchers argued that their animal experiments
were in fact conducted for the benefit of public health (although Beach
made no such rationalization).
Thus, despite the grandiose claims of the Berkeley investigators, there is
no evidence that they have achieved any actual advances in the treatment of
psychological or neurological disorders. Certainly the most common verbal justification
for receiving public funding for physiological psychology research on animals
was that such research has led to or will lead to an "advance." Apparently,
in the lexicon of the physiological psychologist, the word "advance" can
have a variety of meanings. Upon analysis, however, the verbal descriptions
of "advances" attributed to animal experimentation turn out to be
either: 1) tautologous (e.g., Freeman's "finding" that the "brain
is not a computer") or 2) false (e.g., Zucker's contention that biorhythm
research on animals led to phototherapy for SAD). Nor, on the basis of historical
evidence, is the claim that physiological psychology research on animals will
lead to advances against mental or neurological disorders in the future tenable.
There is no evidence that animal models of psychopathology have improved mental
health. Thus, it is hardly surprising that physiological psychology research
on animals - which is in essence a form of philosophical investigation - has
not improved public health. Virtually every drug known to be effective in controlled
trials against human mental disease was discovered through clinical serendipity
- from side-effects in actual human patients. Recognizing this fact, in a recent
book on Alzheimer's disease, the editors wrote:
Clearly selecting and pursuing a treatment strategy for Alzheimer's disease is a difficult and expensive decision. It may be wise to advise the corporate executive to use an historical perspective. Perhaps a look into the past can give a glimpse into the future. In this regard, the potential of serendipity cannot be overlooked when evaluating treatment (research) strategies. Throughout the history of medicine, there are examples of a significant advance coming about as a result of careful clinical monitoring of a drug that was supposed to do something else but had an effect in an unpredicted direction. Iproniazid in tuberculosis patients leading to a new class of (antidepressants) is an outstanding example, as are the tricyclic antidepressants originally developed as antipsychotics. Perhaps there exists a drug available today that when looked at with the proper perspective would shed light on new and effective treatment strategies for AD (Alzheimer's Disease)" (Crook et al., 1986, p. 665).
For many years, leading clinical pharmacologists have attempted to convince the federal government to fund an independent agency that would be devoted to collecting information on the therapeutic side-effects of existing drugs, but to no avail (Marshall, 1980). Instead, the government continues to support academic research with virtually no potential for improving public health. Given the need for clinically relevant research and for public health, the investment of limited funds in physiology psychology appears unsound. It appears that continued support of physiological psychology reflects the success of physiological psychologists to convince the popular press that they deserve credit for clinical insights and treatments that were in fact contributions from other fields of inquiry. Physiological psychology seems to be more a philosophical exercise than a science, and critics such as Bannister have questioned whether it can even address philosophical questions.
1. Hormones and Behaviour Research
3. Mother-Infant Separation Research
Discussion and Conclusion